Borrowing decisions affect most households, with large stakes and implications for subfields as varied as macroeconomics and industrial organization. I review theoretical and empirical work on household debt: its prevalence, level, growth, and composition, as well as various measures of consumer choice and market (in)efficiency, elasticities, and prices, including new evidence on how borrowing heterogeneity affects the distribution of the opportunity cost of consumption. I also discuss opportunities and challenges in policy evaluation. A key takeaway is that puzzles abound, and I highlight numerous avenues for further research.
I. Introduction
Why do research on household debt?
One reason is high stakes, in absolute and relative terms. U.S. households owe $12-13 trillion in debt, down slightly from the peak in mid 1 Households borrow using an increasingly rich constellation of loan products, at real interest rates ranging from near zero to quadruple-digit APRs.
Another reason is that these high stakes are prevalent: they affect most households, including poorer households. More U.S. households participate in the credit card market (about 70%) than hold stocks directly or indirectly (about 50%), and participation rates are substantial in the other big U.S. consumer debt markets-mortgages (45%), student loans (19%), and car loans (30%).
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Perhaps the most important reason is that behavior in debt markets has implications for many domains beyond the liability side of the household balance sheet. Borrowing decisions are an apt arena for developing and testing intertemporal choice models that can be applied across many fields. The interest rate on debt determines the opportunity cost of consumption or investment for most households. The combination of low-frequency, high-stakes decisions (e.g., mortgage and student loan choices) and high-frequency, lower-stakes decisions (e.g., credit card use) is reminiscent of many types of human capital investment (in education, health, child-rearing, etc.).
Household credit markets are a fertile setting for applying contract theory, and for studying the interactions of (less sophisticated) consumers with (more sophisticated) firms. The absence of a robust advice market suggests the likelihood of gains from trade with literatures on expertise and delegation. The (attempted) regulation of debt markets provides illuminating examples of policymaking and its effects under enforcement constraints.
entrepreneurs, and small businesses, because most small firms are closely held by the households that own and operate them.
Section II provides some key facts on how much and how people borrow, with an eye towards providing a quick institutional primer on household debt and introducing some open questions at the intersection of household finance, macroeconomics, contract theory, and industrial organization. Key themes here include unexplained dramatic growth in consumer debt, the economic importance of small-dollar credit and debt collection markets, the potential importance of bundling durable purchases with financing, and unexplained variation in contracting practices (particularly across markets and countries).
Section III reviews evidence and open questions on the (in)efficiency of consumer choice in debt markets, bringing together various literatures that are typically thought of as disparate.
Mounting evidence on the downstream impacts of credit use paints a muddled picture of whether consumers actually make themselves (weakly) better off by borrowing. Comparable evidence on consumer decisions to work out or default on debt is thinner but more encouraging. Evidence on consumer search and price dispersion suggests that many households leave substantial amounts of money on the table by failing to find good deals on loans, although what drives this tendency and allows it to persist in equilibrium remains poorly understood. Evidence on allocation suggests that consumers are far more efficient at minimizing costs conditional on their set of contracts than they are at choosing debt contracts. It will be important to unpack why this is.
Section IV reviews empirical evidence on several key inputs to models of household debt. I start by providing some new evidence on the opportunity cost of consumption or investment, and
show that debt and create constraints create substantial wedges between this cost and the riskfree rate. I estimate that about 75% of households face a shadow cost exceeding the risk-free rate, 7 with 45% of households facing a cost of at least 10%. I also discuss the scant evidence on borrowing motives, and the substantial evidence on binding credit constraints. The latter is surprising given a long trend of innovations in risk-based pricing, and that economic models underpredict consumer borrowing. I.e., consumers borrow substantially more, and more expensively, than we would predict, yet they still have excess demand on the margin.
Compounding this puzzle is evidence of price elasticity in credit cards and home equity loans, although this is tempered by findings of inelastic demand in first-mortgages and car loans.
Section V draws heavily on Zinman (forthcoming) in briefly reviewing some key theories and empirical tests thereof, with a focus on the question of whether consumer credit markets produce efficient allocations. Three classes of models identify failures that lead to credit undersupply: market power, regulatory failure, and several varieties of asymmetric information.
But several newer classes of models predict overborrowing: other varieties of asymmetric information, externalities in collateral asset values, deleveraging frictions, systemic risk, and behavioral biases can lead to too much borrowing in some sense. Overall there is a lack of evidentiary consensus on whether markets err, and in which direction. We do not yet have a clear understanding of whether and under what conditions markets over-supply and/or under-supply credit, much less why.
Section VI discusses opportunities and challenges facing policy-focused research. The amount of policy activity is trending up, motivating both theory and empirics on policy design and evaluation. But challenges old and new confront this work, including limited empirical evidence on key modeling assumptions, underpowered natural experiments, and several factors that can make it difficult to identify the rules created by policy changes: limited enforcement, regulator discretion, and "shadow regulation".
Section VII concludes with a recap of promising avenues for future research.
II. How much and how people borrow: Debt growth, levels, and contracts
This section focuses on how much and how people borrow: the growth of consumer debt over recent decades and drivers thereof, recent and current debt levels, and characteristics of different product markets (and contract types). I postpone discussion of household-level prevalence and heterogeneity to Section IV. My main objectives in this section are to provide a basic institutional foundation for the rest of the paper, and to introduce three important and understudied questions. Two sit at intersections of macroeconomics and household finance, and ask what explains aggregate borrowing and growth rates, within-and across-countries. The third sits at an intersection of industrial organization, contract theory, and household finance, and asks what determines the rich constellation of loan product markets that we observe in equilibrium.
A. Growth
Household leverage has grown remarkably in real terms. 8 Total household debt roughly doubled between 2000 and 2007 alone, and U.S. household debt/GDP has grown about fourfold over the post-World War II period (fivefold if we measure the ratio at its peak in 2009).
What explains this growth? One likely key factor is technological change in loan production (Dynan 2009; Edelberg 2006) , including but not limited to reductions in distribution costs, riskbased pricing, monitoring and repossession, 9 and securitization and other secondary market innovations. The degree to which such changes actually represent advances in a welfare sense is a subject of much debate that is beyond the scope of this review (e.g., Lerner and Tufano 2012) , although I touch on some related issues in Section V. It also remains unclear just how important changes to the loan production function have been relative to the other factors discussed below.
A related possibility is that the technology of persuasion has improved as well. A growing body of evidence suggests that uninformative sales tactics--sometimes accompanied by nonlinear contracts that "shroud" key attributes (Gabaix and Laibson 2006; and Murooka 2014)--increase the quantity and/or total cost of borrowing (Agarwal and Evanoff 2013; Marianne Bertrand et al. 2010; Gine, Martinez, and Keenan 2014; Gurun, Matvos, and Seru 2014) . This work does not speak to the trend in question-have lenders gotten more effective at convincing consumers to borrow?-and of course some tricks of the trade, like "monthly payments marketing", have changed little over the decades (Stango and Zinman 2011) .
But other trends are quite consistent with a change in the technology of persuasion. Direct marketing has grown dramatically in the post-war period, and especially so in the IT era (how much of this marketing is actually purely persuasive, as opposed to informative in the classical sense, is an open question). There also seems to be far more shrouded and teaser pricing now than even 25 years ago, with bank checking account overdrafts (Stango and Zinman 2014a) , credit card introductory rates and penalty fees (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, et al. 2014; S. DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004; Heidhues and Koszegi 2010) , and adjustable rate mortgages (Gurun, Matvos, and Seru 2014) among the most prominent examples. These developments suggest that there may be complementarity between innovations in pricing and marketing, a hypothesis that is just one among many worth testing as we seek to understand technologies of persuasion.
Another likely key factor is the rise in real house prices (Christelis, Ehrmann, and Georgarakos 2013; Dynan and Kohn 2007; Mian and Sufi 2011a) . This is germane given that much of the growth in household debt has been in mortgages.
Another factor that is drawing scrutiny is income inequality. Some studies suggest that rising inequality leads to increased supply by increasing loanable funds (e.g., Kumhof, Ranciere, and Winant 2014) . Others have suggested that rising inequality leads to increased loan demand through social preferences (reference points and/or peer effects); I am not aware of any papers that have attempted to fully work out the demand side, but Georgarakos et al (2014) is an interesting starting point.
Other possible factors include demographic shifts (Dynan and Kohn 2007; Christelis, Ehrmann, and Georgarakos 2013) and reduced generosity in social insurance (Hacker 2008) . I am skeptical about the latter because it could easily push in the wrong direction--lenders presumably decrease supply as the variance of applicant cash flows increases (Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer 2014)--and precautionary saving effects could swamp emergency borrowing effects.
Cross-country comparisons should prove to be useful in teasing apart the contribution of different growth factors. Christelis et al (2013) is a start in this direction, as indicated by the discussion directly below. flexible and nonlinear contracting 2014) , direct marketing (Han, Keys, and Li 2013) , and product differentiation (with affinity co-branding, rewards programs, prestige tiering, etc.). About 68% of households held a credit card in 2010, down from 73% in in 2007 (Bricker et al. 2012) . Outstandings peaked at just over $1 trillion in 2007q4, and have been around the low $800 millions since mid-2010 (source: G.19).
B. Levels
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Of course, outstanding debt is not the only measure of economic importance. For example, total borrowing costs also matter. By this metric, the gap between credit cards and mortgages
closes from an order of magnitude to a factor of 3 or so 19 , to take just one example.
We should consider the incidence of borrowing costs as well as the level. This is particularly important in "small-dollar" loan markets that serve subprime, and often low-income, households
at APRs that typically start in the triple digits. Payday loan borrowers spent $7.4 billion 20 to borrow $40 billion in 2010 on maturities of mostly 2-4 weeks. 21 A typical payday loan amount is a few hundred dollars, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) finds that over 80% of loans are rolled over or followed by another loan within 14 days (Burke et al. 2014) . of pawn shops has grown 50% since the start of the Great Recession, after years of decline, with 18 Noisy estimates that deal with data limitations suggest that a large fraction of these balances are "revolving" (accruing interest)-see Brown et al (2011 , and the data on credit card borrowing costs in footnote 17. 19 Credit card issuer (lender) revenues from finance charges and fees have amounted to roughly $120-$150 billion in recent years, depending on how interchange fees are accounted for (http://www.cuinsight.com/press-release/2013-card-industry-revenue-another-downtick ). I am not aware of a comparable figure for consumer mortgage lenders, but if the $8 trillion in outstanding first-mortgage balances is earning a mean balance-weighted APR of 5%, that would be $400 billion in revenue for lenders and costs for borrowers. 20 Payday loans are often "secured" by a post-dated check or ACH debit authorization, and the $7.4 billion does not include overdraft or other fees incurred if there are insufficient funds in the account when the lender makes its claim. 21 This volume of lending and borrowing costs is substantially depressed by regulations in several states that effectively prohibit payday loan contracts (Kaufman 2013). 22 See also Skiba and Tobacman (2008) . 
A. Downstream impacts of credit access
One way of measuring choice efficiency is by identifying the downstream effects of borrowing decisions on more-ultimate outcomes of interest like overall financial condition and subjective well-being. In a classical world, such analysis would be trivial in a qualitative sensewe would infer that borrowing makes borrowers weakly better off, in expectation, by revealed preference. But a gamut of behavioral possibilities makes it plausible that some-perhaps many--households "overborrow" (Section V). 29 To this end, a burgeoning literature seeks to identify impacts of small-dollar credit on U.S. borrowers. It finds mixed results: some studies find large positive impacts, others find large negative impacts, and others null effects (Zinman forthcoming). 30 Whether this pattern is due to true underlying heterogeneity (e.g., in samples or 29 Oft-overlooked is the possibility that even behavioral borrowers do better with expanded formal credit access, given that their counterfactual may be continued use of alternatives that are even more expensive and less flexible. See Zinman (forthcoming) for a discussion. 30 A parallel literature takes the same approach with respect to microcredit in developing countries. Several randomized evaluations have found modestly positive results (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015) , with the one set of very encouraging results coming from the one lender studied thus far that explicitly makes consumer loans and does not target microentrepreneurs (Karlan and Zinman 2010) . I am not aware of any study, in any setting, that convincingly identifies effects on inframarginal borrowers, settings), or merely to heterogeneity in study quality, is difficult to discern at this point and vital to unpack going forward.
B. Credit as insurance and exercising an option to default
A related question is how well people take advantage of opportunities to extricate themselves from problematic debt burdens. Defaulting on debt is a multifaceted option that is complicated to value (White 1998 31 and I hope we soon see more studies of similar activities in the U.S. (Agarwal, Amromin, et al. 2013; Gerardi and Li 2010) .
C. Contract choice and price dispersion
Another metric of choice efficiency is the extent to which, in a market with price dispersion, households choose deals at the cost-minimizing frontier. 32 Although not every paper described here takes the same approach, to fix ideas think of the key question as being: how much which is a key consideration in environments where policymakers are considering restricting access to credit. 31 A handful of papers study recent debt forgiveness interventions in developing countries; see, e.g., Kanz (2013) . 32 One can also estimate the ex-ante efficiency of usage-contingent contracts from the same menu; see, e.g., Agarawal et al (2013) .
borrower-level price dispersion 33 persists after controlling for borrower credit risk and other product attributes (Stango and Zinman 2014b) ? 34 A useful thought experiment is to consider two consumers with the same credit characteristics (e.g., credit score, LTV, etc.), taking up the same product (e.g., a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage). Do these two borrowers take loans with substantially different APRs? The answer seems to be "yes, often", raising questions about the economic consequences of this heterogeneity for borrowers, and about how consumer heterogeneity interacts with lender competition to produce price dispersion in equilibrium.
Most of the work along these lines has focused on mortgages. Several papers find evidence suggesting that many millions of mortgagors pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars in markups they could avoid with a seemingly modest amount of additional shopping effort or sophistication at origination (for cites see , and the last paragraph in this sub-section ). It also appears that many borrowers leave money on the table in comparison to an optimal refinancing benchmark , with some evidence that errors of commission are somewhat common (refinancing too soon), and that errors of omission are particularly large (Agarwal, Rosen, and Yao 2012; Keys, Pope, and Pope 2014) .
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In credit cards, Stango and Zinman (2014b) estimate a residual APR interquartile range of several hundred basis points, even after controlling for borrower credit risk and other card attributes. In student loans, there is mounting hue and cry about students being duped into taking inferior deals in the private market before maxing out their subsidized federal loan allocation, but I have not seen this quantified.
36 33 Other loan terms are interesting in their own right, including the choice of fixed vs. adjustable interest rate in the mortgage markets (Badarinza, Campbell, and Ramadorai 2013; Bucks and Pence 2008) and of course loan amount, including the decision of whether to borrow at all (Sections III-A and V; Cadena and Keys (2012) ). 34 Given the potential importance of non-price attributes, I focus on studies that examine choices within a product market. Other papers examine contract choice across product markets, with the goal of ascertaining whether users of small-dollar products might instead be able to access cheaper and more flexible mainstream products. Bhutta et al (forthcoming) find little evidence of this: people apply for payday loans when they have limited access to mainstream credit. Agarwal and Bos (2014) find a similar pattern for Swedish pawn borrowers. 35 Those making serious errors of commission are prevalent enough to be categorized by participants in the mortgage-backed securities industry, as "woodheads". See also Andersen et al (2014) on Denmark. 36 The argument is that federal loans are both cheaper, and more flexible in repayment options, than private loans. (However, it is less clear that public loans dominate private loans in bankruptcy situations.) The modest penetration of the private student loan market-about 3 million borrowers-creates an upper
What drives all of this dispersion? Stango and Zinman (2014b) 
D. Debt Allocation
Ex-post debt allocation is another important margin of choice (in)efficiency. The question here is: given a set of debt contracts, how efficiently does the household minimize borrowing costs? The sharpest way to address this question is to look within a product class. This approach is particularly useful in the U.S. credit card market, where most households hold multiple cards with different APRs (Stango and Zinman 2014b) , and theories abound for why people would not follow a strictly cost-minimizing strategy (Ponce, Seira, and Zamarripa 2014 ). Yet Stango and Zinman (2014b) find that nearly everyone allocates debt to their lowest-cost card, subject to credit limit constraints.
38 bound on the current prevalence of this potential problem, although to be fair much of the policy concern is based on the potential rather than the actual size of the private market. 37 See also Gine et al's (2014) audit study in Mexico. 38 This data is from 2006-2008 and includes the balance transfer problem studied in Agarwal et al (2009) and Agarwal and Mazmuder (2013) , which was much narrower in scope-it affected those who transferred a balance, in full, and then made new "convenience" purchases that they could float on the old card, during the teaser-pricing period of the balance transfer. The problem stemmed from the practice of "negative payment hierarchy", whereby issuers not only priced new purchases strictly higher than the transferred balance during the teaser period, but also applied any repayments to lower-APR balances first.
Cross-product comparisons are much trickier due to non-price heterogeneity. For example, making monetized comparisons between using a home equity vs. credit card line of credit requires additional assumptions or data on risk preferences and expectations about future credit constraints. A more-scrutinized example is what I have dubbed "borrowing high and lending low", a phenomenon brought to modern prominence by Gross and Souleles (2002b) . But Telyukova (2013) shows that nearly all simultaneous revolving of credit card debt and holdings of highly liquid assets can be rationalized by transaction frictions. 39 Becker and Shabani (2010) consider a broader set of assets and liabilities, taking into account the proposition that the return to paying down debt is typically strictly greater than the (risk-free) return on investing in assets, and find little inefficiency.
All told, it seems that the weight of the available evidence leads to a pair of striking inferences: households are remarkably efficient and homogenous at allocating debt across the contracts they already have, but remarkably inefficient and heterogeneous in choosing those contracts. More work is needed to unpack and whether and why this is the case.
IV. Evidence on modeling inputs: Intertemporal prices and substitution
This section provides and reviews empirical evidence on several key inputs to models of household debt, starting with intertemporal prices and then turning to various measures of, and motives for, intertemporal substutition.
A. Intertemporal prices
The price of consumption (real interest rate) is a key factor in most models of intertemporal choice. Household debt affects this price when there is a wedge between savings yields and borrowing costs. Following the discussion of portfolio choice at the level of the household
The CARD Act has largely outlawed negative payment hierarchy. Ponce et al (2014) find substantially less cost minimization in Mexico. 39 Another way of seeing that even small differences in liquidity between credit cards and checking accounts could reconcile the apparent puzzle is to note that most U.S. households probably run incredibly "lean" in their checking accounts. Stango and Zinman (2014a) find that 83% of account-months have a minimum balance < $100. See Section IV-C for some related evidence on liquidity constraints.
balance sheet in Section III-D, it bears reiterating that, in a proximate sense, the price of consumption is not necessarily dictated by a risk-free rate of return on a financial asset (I dub this the "traditional" risk-free rate) . It may instead be determined by a strictly higher risk-free rate of return from paying down debt (the "true" risk-free rate).
So how many households face a true rate that exceeds the traditional rate, due to borrowing or unmet demand for credit (credit constraints)? And how big are the wedges? Figures 2a and 2b present some new summary tabulations, based on 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances data, that take each household and assign it an effective marginal interest rate based on Max{30-year Treasury rate, Max(interest rate on outstanding debt)}. 40 Figure 2a shows that an estimated 70% of U.S. households are borrowing at an interest rate > traditional risk-free rate, with about 25% facing a true nominal interest rate of at least 10%. Figure 2b attempts to incorporate credit constraints and hence is more accurate in my view. Here I take those who report being creditrationed or discouraged from applying and place them in the uppermost bin (>= 19%). This leads to about 75% of households facing a true rate > the traditional rate, with about 45% facing an interest rate of at least 10%. Figure 3 decomposes the source of the shadow cost for the (would-be) borrowers in Figure   2b . 31% of borrowing households are classified based on being rationed and/or discouraged from applying for credit. 22% and 11% have their price determined by credit cards or payday loans (these are almost certainly lower bounds, as discussed in the next paragraph). 30% have their price determined by secured credit, with over half of these due to a first mortgage.
Three measurement issues suggest that these Figures understate the true mass at the extremes. One is the SCF's incomplete coverage of small-dollar borrowing. 41 Two is the substantial underreporting of unsecured, expensive debt in surveys Zinman 40 I assign household to the Treasury rate if they have no debt or if the maximum interest paid on any loan is less than the Treasury rate in 2010, presumably due to having obtained a fixed-rate loan (usually a mortgage) that is either subsidized or was originated at a time when market rates were lower than they were in 2010.
2010).
42 Three is that I use pre-tax interest rates that do not take into account the favorable tax treatment on mortgages for those who itemize. This likely affects a nontrivial but certainly not enormous set of households; e.g., Figure 3 estimates that only 17% of debtors have their opportunity cost determined by a first mortgage.
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In any case, the results here and elsewhere (Becker and Carroll 2001) . This is the credit card debt puzzle I mentioned at the outset, but it presumably also applies to other long-term or serial borrowing in products like subprime auto or small-dollar loans.
B. Why do households borrow?
What generates high perceived returns to household debt: why do households borrow?
Empirical evidence on this questions yields clues about potential solutions to the puzzlingly high prevalence and level of high-cost debt, and informs modeling decisions about how to specify borrowing motives. For example, in Guerreri and Lorenzoni (2012) borrowers smooth transitory income fluctuations, and in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) borrowers are less patient than savers. I suspect that substantial amounts of household borrowing are financing investment in 42 Much of the underreporting is on the extensive margin, for small-dollar loans. This could lead to substantial underestimation (several percentage points) of the proportion of households in the highest-cost bin. See also Karlan and Zinman (2008a) on underreporting in South Africa. 43 Given non-borrowers, non-itemizers, and those borrowing at post-tax rates > risk-free, I would guess that Figures 3a and 3b understate the prevalence of households facing the Treasury rate by about 5 percentage points.
closely held businesses (Robb and Robinson forthcoming), suggesting a potential link to the private equity premium puzzle (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002) .
Given the size of the mortgage and auto loan markets, it is tempting to infer that most marginal spending must be on durables (and human capital, in the student loan case). But given the fungibility of money, and collateral constraints, this need not be the case. Moreover, much of the puzzling debt is in unsecured credit markets. There is little direct evidence on where households spend their marginal dollars of debt financing, 44 and circumstantial evidence paints a muddled picture of the importance of different motives.
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C. Credit constraints: Measurement and interpretation
The continued prevalence of credit constraints (Figures 2b and 3 ) is noteworthy and somewhat puzzling in its own right: for all of the advances in risk-based pricing, mechanism design, nonlinear contracting etc., prices are still quite far from clearing consumer credit markets! This seems true, at least episodically, even in secured credit markets; see, e.g., Bhutta (2014) for a detailed discussion, and various approaches to identification applied in the Philippines. 45 In addition to the studies of durables markets discussed above, note also the studies of downstream impacts (many of which are consistent with transitory smoothing, or overborrowing), and studies of interactions between borrowing and social insurance (Sullivan 2008; Hsu, Matsa, and Melzer 2014) 46 In the 2009 TNS Global Economic Crisis survey nearly one-half of Americans report being certainly or probably not able to come up with $2,000 in 30 days to deal with an unexpected shock (Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano 2011). (2011a). An oft-overlooked but informative approach is to estimate maturity elasticities: strong ones are consistent with binding liquidity constraints (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou 2008) . 47 The most popular approach to identifying constraints relies on tracking spending responses to income changes (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010) . Some particularly striking findings from this literature come from papers that have data to directly examine borrowing responses in the wake of income shocks. Agarwal et al (2007) find that, following the 2001 federal income tax rebates, the average consumer first paid down credit card debt, but soon afterward increased her spending, leading to a net increase in spending of about 40% of the rebate amount. Highutilization and low-limit cardholders increased their spending, while debt repayment (savings) rose for plausibly less-constrained cardholders. 48 Aaronson et al (2012) find that an increase in the minimum wage has a multiplier effect on spending that is driven by a small number of households making large, debt-financed automobile purchases. Several papers find that the magnitude of spending declines during the Great Recession increases with ex-ante household leverage (Baker 2014; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013; Mian and Sufi 2014a ).
But we still have a long way to go to understand the normative impacts of credit constraints.
In the not too-distant past, prevalent credit constraints would have been interpreted as a sign of inefficiency-most often, as a symptom of undersupply borne of asymmetric information problems. These days, we approach credit constraints with more nuance and ambivalence, in light of various theories of overborrowing (Section V). Credit constraints can be a good thing, if behavioral tendencies, externalities, and/or certain varieties of asymmetric information lead markets to produce too much debt. The normative properties of credit constraints may even vary over time: desirable, in a 2 nd -best sense, in steady-state, but disastrous in certain crises (Zinman forthcoming).
D. Demand Elasticities
Given the prevalence of liquidity constraints and high (perceived) internal rates of return, one might expect low price sensitivity in consumer credit markets. In fact the evidence, while 47 See also Karlan and Zinman (2008b) 50 It may also be important to account for the presence or absence of a durable purchase that is tied to the financing, and/or for the possibility that sensitivity varies nonlinearly with stakes.
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49 Ponce et al (2014) find elasticities of similar magnitude to Gross and Souleles, in the Mexico credit card market. But Alan and Loranth (2013) find little sensitivity to price increases in U.K. credit cards, and Karlan and Zinman (2008b) find very strong price sensitivity to a price increase in a South African small-dollar market. 50 Karlan and Zinman (2014) take this approach, in the Mexico microcredit market. 51 E.g., by incorporating optimization frictions a la Chetty's work on labor supply (see Chetty (2012) and cites therein).
V. How to explain the facts? Theories and theory-testing
How do we explain the litany of facts presented above? There is a shortage of unifying explanations but no shortage of theories that focus on important pieces of the puzzle. This section provides very brief overview of key classes of theories and theory-testing that draws heavily on Zinman (forthcoming), which provides a more detailed review.
One way to make sense of theoretical work on household debt is to organize our thinking around what I take to be the two most important threshold questions animating research and policy: do consumer credit markets produce efficient allocations? Why or why not?
Three classes of theories flesh out mechanisms that lead to under-supply. One is bad-oldfashioned market power. There is little evidence that plain-vanilla market power is important, but the evidence on price dispersion (Section III-C) is consistent with lenders enjoying market power due to search and/or switch costs (see also Knittel and Stango (2003) on tacit collusion). Whether this leads to over-or under-supply on net remains to be identified, and presumably depends on demand elasticities and more-primitive parameters. For example, search and switch costs arising from behavioral factors (I don't shop because I procrastinate) could indicate over-supply rather than under-supply. A second is regulatory failure. For example, it may be that missing rungs in the lender ladder are due to state regulations that outlaw the very products that would fill the gaps. I have heard market participants make this argument, but have yet to see a comprehensive accounting of the relevant laws or a convincing analysis of the impacts of the laws on entry.
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The third class of theory of under-supply is asymmetric information that produces credit rationing a la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . There are actually multiple classes here, for different varieties of asymmetric information: hidden information, hidden action, and interactions between the two (principally, selection on moral hazard). These theories have helped motivate countless interventions to increase credit supply-subsidies, guarantees, direct lending, etc.--and empirical evidence on whether, how, and how much asymmetric information actually affects market 52 Generally speaking it does seem to be the case that state laws restricting high-cost consumer loans from non-bank providers, like payday lenders, do have teeth (Kaufman 2013; McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Kuehn 2013) . The bank vs. non-bank distinction is legally significant because the Marquette Supreme Court decision in 1978 upheld the ability of national banks to "export" rates from states with more favorable regulation to states with less favorable regulation. And the distinction is economically significant because banks have tended to stay out of product markets with APRs higher than credit cards, presumably because they are discouraged from doing so by their supervisors/regulators. (The one exception is checking account-linked products like overdraft and cash advance, which are viewed differently by the law and by bank supervisors for various reasons, some of which are more framing than substance.) outcomes is finally catching up to theory and practice. Examples include Adams et al (2009) and Dobbie and Skiba (2013) on subprime auto and payday loans, several papers on mortgage securitization (e.g., Keys et al. 2010; Bubb and Kaufman 2014) , and a growing literature on strategic default by mortgagors (e.g., Mayer et al. forthcoming).
Several classes of theories flesh out mechanisms that can produce too much debt.
Advantageous selection (de Meza and Webb 1987; 2000) It is also important emphasize that fire sale models generate too much debt "only" in a constrained/2 nd -best sense. The negative externality materializes only because there is actually too little debt at critical junctures, when a shock makes it such that asset markets lack sufficient liquidity to clear at fair prices.
Two new classes of model have a similar property. One shows how deleveraging can slow recovery from an exogenous macro shock given monetary policy that is constrained by a zero bound (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012; Hall 2011) . So debt levels can be too high conditional on there being a bad shock that induces substantial deleveraging, and conditional on frictions that make some agents liquidity constrained. Remove the liquidity constraints (or mute the surprise, perhaps by mitigating asymmetric information) and high leverage is unlikely to exacerbate downturns (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013) . Mian and Sufi (2011b; also find empirical evidence consistent with these models, although see Justiniano et al (2013) (Khandani, Lo, and Merton 2012) . Bhutta and Keys (2013) find empirical support for the model. Note that both of the frictions generating inefficiency in the model-collateral indivisibility and the lack of an equity market for homeowners--could, in principle, be mitigated with financial innovations that addressed the underlying source of the constraints (moral hazard?). So again we have a model that has too much debt entering a downturn, and too little debt/liquidity during the downturn. A critical question for welfare and policy analysis is whether we should take those liquidity constraints-frictions that bind, at the very least, during times of crisis--as given.
The puzzlingly high equilibrium debt burdens and interest rates discussed in Section II, along with strong responses to plausibly uninformative stimuli like reminders (Stango and Zinman 2014a ) and some advertising (Marianne Bertrand et al. 2010 ) have helped motivate the growing body of work posits that consumers are "behavioral" in ways that predispose them to overborrow (under-save) relative to some benchmark. What is the benchmark? I focus on models where consumers have some bias that can lead to excessive borrowing. 53 So the benchmark is "unbiased", and hence often neoclassical.
What sorts of behavioral biases are thought to matter, and how do economists model them?
One way of understanding behavioral economics, methodologically speaking, is as a specification problem in an otherwise standard economic model. The types of pieces are standard, but even sometimes suggests that we should consider shaping them differently.
Preferences may be time-inconsistent ( In contrast, a lack of knowledge (e.g., a lack of financial literacy) seems to me unlikely to produce overborrowing in the absence of biases. I suspect that a rational actor who lacks knowledge will in some cases get her debt level right on average (making mistakes in both directions that cancel out), and in other cases borrow less if a risk associated with borrowing leads her to opt-out of the market, a la Calvet et al (2007) on financial asset markets.
whether/how someone solves a problem, conditional on parameter values) may rely on crude heuristics or vary with attention shocks (Stango and Zinman 2014a) .
Why don't the standard forces of competition, delegation, and/or learning mitigate or neutralize the effects of any behavioral biases? A growing literature models how behavioral consumers contract with sophisticated firms, and finds equilibria where firms profit from exploiting behavioral consumers rather than helping them overcome their biases. 54 Casual empiricism suggests that the advice market for liabilities is limited in scope, of dubious quality, and interacts in interesting ways with low consumer willingness to pay for unbiased advice.
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Opportunities for learning from one's own experience may be limited; e.g., many households obtain a mortgage only at decennial frequencies. And new theories suggest that consumers may not learn about their biases even when faced with ample opportunities to do so (Ali 2011; Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond 2013; Eil and Rao 2011; Schwartzstein forthcoming) . Social learning can produce herding and inefficient equilibria (Banerjee 1992; Eyster and Rabin 2010) .
Links between behavioral biases, equilibrium contracts, and consumer debt levels are intriguing but remain largely speculative. Overall the work is characterized by bias-/modelproliferation, and a lack of empirical work testing distinct testable predictions of one or more of the behavioral explanations.
Panning back out to the eight classes of theory, there is some evidence for each class, but no consensus on which class of model(s) is most descriptive. We still do not have a clear sense of whether consumer credit markets produce too much, too little, or just the right amount of debt.
VI. Research and policy: Some key issues
The advent of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and increased activity by other federal and state actors in the wake of the financial crisis is creating opportunities and demand for policy-focused research on household debt.
54 See also Ellison (2006) and DellaVigna (2009) for reviews of what is variously referred to as behavioral, or boundedly rational, industrial organization. 55 There has been more work estimating the quality of financial advice on the asset side of the household balance sheet, and the results are not encouraging. See, e.g., Malkiel (2013) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) .
Policy approaches to consumer credit markets befit the unresolved tensions described in the preceding section, at least when it comes to interventions that seek to directly affect prices and/or quantities. Some seek to expand access; subsidies or guarantees are common levers to this end.
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Others seek to restrict access; price caps and restrictions on underwriting criteria are common levers to this end. 57 As discussed above, evidence on the effects and welfare implications of these sorts of interventions is limited, and mixed.
The other traditional policy pillar in consumer finance is mandated, point-of-sale disclosure.
Heavy reliance on this approach has come under fire for various reasons, including enforcement costs (Stango and Zinman 2011) and behavioral factors (Loewenstein, Sunstein, and Golman 2014 Classical work on disclosure equilibria (Milgrom 2008) suggests that some oft-overlooked components of financial literacy could be particularly (socially) beneficial: awareness of the distribution of supplier quality, and "skepticism" or "wariness" of firm incentives (Dranove and Jin 2010 In short, it seems probable the researchers will be faced with a proliferation of policy changes that offer the possibility of natural experiments. But it seems even more likely that substantial methodological and substantive progress will be required to improve the evaluation and design of consumer financial policies.
VII. Conclusion
Household borrowing choices and markets present a bevy of fascinating facts and puzzles. I close by recapping some particularly fruitful questions for further research. Many of these sit at intersections with other subfields like industrial organization, contract theory, behavioral economics, and macroeconomics, and highlight the potential for gains from trade across literatures.
Persistently high debt levels of expensive unsecured debt-whether in credit cards or smalldollar credit products--remain confounding for any extant model. The evidence on choice inefficiency suggests that a good chunk of the unexplained portion could be due to overpaying 58 UDAAP === Unfair, Deceptive or Abusive Practices. See, e.g., Farrell (2013) .
for debt rather than overspending on consumption per se (Stango and Zinman 2014b) , but this hypothesis remains to be tested. I suspect that there are similar puzzles in secured debt markets, perhaps due to bundling with durables purchases that induces people to overpay and hence overborrow. There also appears to be a puzzle in how different choice (in)efficiencies fit together: it seems that households leave substantial money on the table when choosing contracts, including whether and how to refinance, yet allocate their balance sheet efficiently conditional on their existing set of contracts.
The extent of household choice inefficiencies also raises questions about the apparent low penetration and low quality of the advice market for household liabilities. Why don't third parties help households make better choices and share in the savings?
The long-run upward trend and recent explosion of consumer debt also present puzzles. It seems likely that innovations in contracting and persuasion have made significant contributions.
But the nature, extent, and implications of these changes are not yet well understood. Nor is it clear why contracts (and sales tactics?) seem to vary so much across countries. Do lending technologies actually vary substantially across settings, and if so why?
It is also important to wrestle with the fact of prevalent credit constraints. Is this a symptom of too much debt, where behavioral factors and/or externalities lead people to overborrow? Or is this a symptom of too little debt, where asymmetric information, market power, and/or regulation create holes in the lending ladder and rationing on the margins of its rungs? More broadly, much work remains to refine and test theories that shed light on whether and why markets (do not) produce optimal allocations of credit (Zinman forthcoming). Questions about how credit and insurance markets interact are also important and understudied, along with their implications for the design of debt forgiveness practices and policy.
Another important question is whether and how credit constraints co-exist with strong price sensitivities of demand. If opportunity costs of consumption are indeed high, yet people still want to borrow, that suggests high private rates of return to borrowed money. But if this is the case then why would people be price elastic on the margin? Are we uncovering information about the true underlying distribution of (perceived) internal rates of return, about differential responses on extensive vs. intensive margins, about some behavioral factor that makes price sensitivity highly context-specific, and/or something else?
Recent history and the current regulatory climate suggest that policy and programmatic changes will continue apace, at various levels of government and practice. Using these changes as natural experiments will require methodological progress in calculating standard errors, identifying anticipatory responses by lenders, and accounting for limited enforcement and various types of regulator discretion. Feeding evidence back into policy and program design will require continued interplay between theory and empirics that wrestles with the incomplete and often conflicting evidence on why, how, how much, and how well households borrow.
Based on weighted data from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances. Risk-free asset return of 3.88% is the yield on 30-year treasuries as of July 1, 2010 (annual average return on money market funds in 2010 was 0.04%). In v1, interest rates greater than the risk-free asset return are the rate on the household's most expensive debt if they have debt. In v2, households that report being rationed or discouraged from applying are in the 19+ bin. Source: author's calculations from the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances. This chart covers the 75% of households who do NOT face the risk-free rate on the margin (see Table 2b ).
